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Towards an Internet Bill of Rights
GIOVANNA DE MINICO
I. SOME QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED
This work seeks to spark some questions about what rules might
be set up for the Internet and what the goals of these rules should be.
The first question examined is whether a binding regulation of the
Internet is required. This debate is mainly propelled by the American
doctrine,1 a doctrine divided between the champions of unchecked selfregulation—drawn by the network providers themselves2—and those in
favour of an absorbing intervention by an authority.3 The second question explored is whether a binding regulation would require a formal
modification of national Constitutions eschewing any reference to the
Internet. This article intends to detail and explore a third alternative: the
proposal of a specific and supranational “Bill of rights” for the Internet.
This proposal prompts further questions: which legislative body
should write this Bill? What should the relationship be between binding
 Professor of Constitutional Law and of Information and Communication Law, Law Department,
University of Naples, Federico II. Visiting Fellow at the London School of Economics. Director
of the University Interdepartmental Research Centre Ermes (www.ermes.unina.it). I would like to
thank Professors Andrew Murray (LSE, London) for his enlightening discussions and Massimo
Villone (Federico II, Naples) for many stimulating suggestions. I would also like to thank the
dedicated staff of Loyola’s International and Comparative Law Review for their helpful feedback
during the editing process.
1. DAWN C. NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM 97-100 (2009).
2. JOHN MATHIASON, INTERNET GOVERNANCE: THE NEW FRONTIER OF GLOBAL
INSTITUTIONS 70-96 (2009); see David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of
Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1371-1380 (1996).
3. John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (Feb. 8, 1996),
http://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html; Joel Reidenberg, Governing Networks and
Rule-Making in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 911, 913 (1996) (discussing paternalism). For a balanced critique to this approach, see ANDREW MURRAY, THE REGULATION OF CYBERSPACE:
CONTROL IN THE ONLINE ENVIRONMENT (2006). Others prefer a transfer of the offline rules
to the online universe while others reconsider the necessity of an ad hoc regulation in the case of
human rights. Compare Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace As/And Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210
(2007) with Robin Mansell, Human Rights and Equity in Cyberspace, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
DIGITAL AGE 1-10 (Andrew D. Murray & Matthias Klang eds., 2004).
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rules and the policies of self-regulation? What kind of content would be
appropriate or necessary to put in the Bill? Should the Bill give greater
weight to fundamental rights than to economic interests? Should supranational case law be a contributing source to the Bill, and if so, to what
extent?
To answer these questions, I will not simply tackle a single freedom concerning netizens. This article’s analysis will instead focus on
the basic need that fundamental rights, normally protected by national
constitutions, should receive universal protection regardless of its territorial boundaries, in accordance with the a-territorial nature of the Internet. Therefore, rather than focusing on specific rights, whether they be
freedom of expression, communication, or the right to access the Internet,4 this article intends to propose the essentials of a statute for fundamental rights, one that is sufficiently general to encompass every freedom, regardless of its specific features. This statute should also be
supranational so that every freedom is consistent regardless of the variances in different nations. This would also ensure equality of treatment.
National instances have given rise to a fragmented and irregular juridical mosaic. Since national legislations are primarily based on the
specific problems of each legal system and tradition, they therefore vary
in scope and content. The U.S. juridical tradition, for instance, has given
particular relevance to some norms5 that help set the boundaries for public powers on copyright law. In the U.K., this same problem has been
tackled by essentially looking at the relationships between soft law and
binding rules in order to affirm the primacy of a binding framework, 6 in
particular, a new copyright concept well-suited to the digital age.7 In
France, in the absence of more comprehensive rules, the attention of
then-President Sarkozy turned toward the publishing interests of record
4. Giovanna De Minico, New Social Rights and Internet: Which Policies Combine Them,
15 INTER. COMM. L. REV. 261 (2013). For a wide overview on specific rights, see Michael
Boardman, Digital Copyright Protection and Graduated Response: A Global Perspective, 33
LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 223, 235-243 (2011) [hereinafter Digital Copyright Protection
and Graduated Response: A Global Perspective].
5. S. 968 112th Cong., (2011); See also S. 3261 112TH Congress; See Annemarie Bridy,
Copyright Policymaking as Procedural Democratic Process: A Discourse-Theoretic Perspective
on ACTA, SOPA, and PIPA, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 105TH Congress, Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, October 28, 1998 (better known as DMCA, this is an example of regulation).
6. For a discussion of possible relationships between self-regulation and binding rules, see
Julia Black, Constitutionalizing self-regulation, MOD. L. REV. 1, 27 (1996).
7. JERRY JIE HUA, TOWARD A MORE BALANCED APPROACH: RETHINKING AND
READJUSTING COPYRIGHT SYSTEMS IN THE DIGITAL NETWORK ERA 141 (Heidelberg: Springer,
2014).
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and film companies, which led to a legislation in 2009 that primarily focused on creating stringent copyright protection.8 In Italy, a substantial
lack of legislative attention on Internet-related issues has been superseded by a very controversial initiative by the competent national Authority.9 Finally, the European Court of Justice has extensively used the
European Union Regulation on E-Commerce addressing the issue of Internet Service Provider accountability.10
These instances clearly prove the existence of an uneven framework born out of occasional pressures and initiatives. This further underlines the necessity of general regulations that extend beyond both national boundaries and the sectional interests prevailing in any given
moment. A comprehensive view of the possible answers will support
the assertion that all technical issues concerning the Internet cannot be
left to the invisible hand of a market-oriented technological development, rather, it should be goal-oriented towards achieving a common
good. Should this happen, the Internet would finally be a unique and effective opportunity for everyone to pursue personal growth and participation in the virtual political process. Such an outcome, however, can
only be ensured through clear choices made by policymakers and
netizens. To outline which choices should be adopted, and how they
should be adopted, is the main goal of this article.
8. In the doctrine : Michael Boardman, Digital Copyright Protection and Graduated Response: A Global Perspective, supra note 4, at 228-229.
See Loi 2009-669 du 12 juin 2009 favorisant la diffusion et la protection de la création sur internet [Law 2009-669 of June 12, 2009 in favor of the districtuion and protection of Copyright on
the Internet], Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF FRANCE],
available
at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000020735432&categorieLie
n=id. On this law the Conseil Constitutionnel intervened with the Décision n° 2009-580 DC, 10
june 200 and declared the unconstitutionality of the provisions 5 and 11, at http://www.conseilconstitutionnel.fr/decision/2009/2009-580-dc/decision-n-2009-580-dc-du-10-juin2009.42666.html.
9. The Authority for Communication Guarantees of Italy (AGCOM) adopted a controversial regulation on Internet copyright. See Delibera n. 680/13/CONS [Deliberation n.
680/13/CONS], available at http://www.agcom.it/default.aspx?DocID=12228. A closer look will
be given to this act in the following pages of this work, infra parag. 3.1.
10. See Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended SA v. Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et
éditeurs
SCRL
(SABAM),
2011
E.C.R.
I-11959
available
at
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=115202&pageIndex=0&doclan
g=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=153683; see also Joined Cases C-236/08 to C238/08, Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, 2010 E.C.R. I-2467, available at
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=83961&pageIndex=0&doclang
=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=154007.
See generally Mario Viola De Azavedo Cunha et al., Peer-to-peer privacy violations and ISP
liability:data protection in the user-generated web, INT’L DATA PRIVACY L., 50, 55-58 (2012).
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II. THE AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVES: SELF-REGULATION OR BINDING
RULES?
The first step of the inquiry is to consider whether a heteronomous
system of regulation, or self-regulation, should be pursued for the Internet, keeping in mind that self-regulation is an inherently multifaceted
notion.11
A direct connection exists between the legal value of selfregulation and its conformity with the relevant legal systems. 12 Acts of
self-regulation, if public powers adequately defined their content and if
authority is vested onto its authors, deserve a place in the conversation
next to binding sources. This is contrary to the case of unfettered selfregulations.
There may be the case of a State leaving all initiative to private
bodies, getting involved only when self-regulation is missing. This form
of self-regulation takes place within the limits of the freedom of negotiation,13 as long as no problem arises, the State does not directly intervene. Nevertheless, the fact that the state may act turns that absence into
a potential presence on the assumption that “if nothing is done State action will follow.”14 This self-regulation model may be defined as “independent” from the law since the law is entirely lacking, even as a minimal framework for the inter partes negotiation.15 This is a historically
regressive model.16 Private stakeholders, when left by themselves, have
shown time and time again that they pursue only egotistical interests. 17
11. LINDA SENDEN, SOFT LAW IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 118-20 (2004).
12. See Anthony Ogus, Rethinking Self-Regulation, 15 OX. J. L. STUD. 97-108 (1995) [hereinafter Rethinking Self-Regulation]; see also Anthony I. Ogus, Regulatory Paternalism: When is
it Justified, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CONTEXT: CORPORATION, STATES, AND MARKETS
IN EUROPE, JAPAN, AND THE US 304-20 (Klaus J. Hoptet al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter Regulatory
Paternalism].
13. Rethinking Self-Regulation, supra note 12, at 101.
14. ROBERT BALDWIN & MARTIN CAVE, UNDERSTANDING REGULATION: THEORY,
STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE 126 (1999).
15. Giovanna De Minico, A Hard Look at Self-Regulation in the UK, 1 EUR. BUS. L. REV.
211 (2006) [hereinafter A Hard Look] (I classified this model as “independent” because the term
appropriately describes a regulation operating outside of a legal framework, therefore coming
close to a praeterlegem rulemaking); see also Linda Senden, Soft Law, Self-Regulation and CoRegulation in European Law: Where Do They Meet?, 9.1 ELEC. J. COMP. L. 12 (2005).
16. A Hard Look, supra note 15, at 188-89. The example of financial markets can show that
when objective values are at stake, such as the good name of single markets, the trust in a free
trade economy and the safety of private savings, the English legislature did no longer rely on onesided regulation. It deeply changed self-regulatory models with the purpose of making public
regulatory powers prevail.
17. See John Kay & John Vickers, Regulatory Reform: An Appraisal, in DEREGULATION OR
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Therefore, the achievement of the common good depends on whenever
it, by chance, happens to correspond with private interests.
In a different model, the State entrusts meaningful social tasks to a
private body while continuing to regulate the overall legal structure and
decision-making process.18 Without maintaining ultimate authority,
there would be no guarantees that the task entrusted to the private body
would be successfully fulfilled. In such a case, self-regulation becomes
an instrument in the hands of public entities where the involved private
body is nothing more than an expression of indirect administration.19
Despite that, an exchange is nevertheless realized between the private
stakeholders and the State; the private stakeholders relinquish in whole,
or in part, their regulating and managing autonomy while the State vests
in the private stakeholders the total, or partial, enforcing power typically
granted by the law.
The question then becomes, what model of regulation would be
better suited for the internet: a self-regulating one independent from the
law or a self-regulation model shaped by binding law that functions as
part of the legal system?
An answer cannot be wholly in favour of self regulation or binding
law, but should be found in an intermediate position. US scholars,20
mainly Lessig,21 have looked for a solution to the regulation issue in
four constraints: “the law, social norms, the market and architecture”. A
good example of how these constraints should mix is shown by the evoRE-REGULATION?: REGULATORY REFORM IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 239 (Giandomenico Majone ed., 1990), (“[Private bodies] “may claim that their objectives are in line with
the public interest, but whether or not this is so will depend on the frameworks in which they operate.”).
18. BALDWIN & CAVE, supra note 14, at 125-126.
19. Sometimes there might be a definitional rather than substantial difference. For instance,
the Italian legal tradition typically refers to a concept of “indirect administration” which comes
close to the concourse among the binding sources and self-regulation set forth by Anthony Ogus
in his article, Rethinking Self-Regulation. The author clearly explains the role of the State: to
promote the competition between the S.R.A. and “lay down a minimum quality standards which
the S.R.A. regimes must presumptively satisfy” Rethinking Self-Regulation, supra note 12, at
106.
20. See, e.g., Charles D. Raab & Paul De Hert, Tools for Technology Regulation: Seeking
Analytical Approaches Beyond Lessig and Hood, in REGULATING TECHNOLOGIES: LEGAL
FUTURES, REGULATORY FRAMES AND TECHNOLOGICAL FIXES 236 (Roger Brownsword & Karen
Yeung eds., 2008); Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 216 (2007);
JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 125-26 (2008);
ANDREW MURRAY, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LAW: THE LAW AND SOCIETY 62-66 (2010)
[hereinafter MURRAY, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LAW].
21. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 122-32 (2006) [hereinafter CODE: VERSION
2.0].

DE MINICO_FINAL_FOR_PUB (DO NOT DELETE)

6

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

9/8/2015 1:40 PM

[Vol. 37:1

lution of piracy in the Internet. Here two values face each other: the
copyright holder’s right to an adequate revenue, and the right of Internet
users to freely access websites.22 Criminal sanctions alone proved to be
largely ineffective, because the illegal download from Internet was not
considered socially reprehensible.23 A turnabout occurred with policies
of substantial price reductions for legal purchases, also due to the introduction of creative commons licensing,24 to the construction of which
scholars gave an essential support.25 Creative Commons offers copyright
holders a simple way to mark their creative works with the freedoms
they intend for it to carry: “[t]hat mark is a license which reserves to the
author some rights, while dedicating to the public rights that otherwise
would have been held privately. As these licenses are nonexclusive and
public, they too effectively build a commons of creative resources that
anyone can build upon.”26 The final outcome was that Internet users
deemed that paying a reasonably low price for legal purchases was more
convenient than facing the possibility of heavy criminal sanctions.
Creative Commons contributed greatly in preventing criminal behavior since they helped educate the community of web surfers to be
lawful by offering them a chance to have their way at a low cost.
In modern societies pluralism is a basic principle, not by chance a
cornerstone of the regulatory issue in the Internet. This principle is construed here in the terms of different sources of law, both public and private, concurring in the regulation. But pluralism must be measured
against the necessity of a legal system,27 i.e. a coherent and comprehensive set of rules. The compatibility is generally assured in European
Civil Law countries through the notion that the sources of law are
placed in a hierarchical order28 specified at a constitutional level. But
22. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 78 (2004), available at http://www.freeculture.cc/freeculture.pdf (“we should be securing income to artists while we allow the market to
secure the most efficient way to promote and distribute content . . . . [T]hese changes should be
designed to balance the protection of the law against the strong public interest that innovation
continue.”) [hereinafter FREE CULTURE].
23. MURRAY, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LAW, supra note 19, at 62-64.
24. CHRISTOPHER T. MARSDEN, INTERNET CO-REGULATION: EUROPEAN LAW,
REGULATORY GOVERNANCE AND LEGITIMACY IN CYBERSPACE 90-91 (2011); See generally
MIKE GODWIN, CYBER RIGHTS: DEFENDING FREE SPEECH IN THE DIGITAL AGE 186-254 (THE
MIT PRESS 2003).
25. Lawrence Lessig, Creative Commons @ 5 Years, CREATIVE COMMONS (Oct. 1, 2007),
http://creativecommons.org/weblog/entry/7693 [hereinafter Creative Commons].
26. LESSIG, CODE, supra note 18, at 199.
27. See, for all, the classic contribution by SANTI ROMANO, L’ORDINAMENTO GIURIDICO
(The Legal System), Sansoni, Firenze, III ed. 1977 (first published in 1918), spec. chap. I.
28. See FEDERICO SORRENTINO, Le fonti del diritto italiano (The sources of the Italian
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also the American experience should be read as posing a precise order
between heteronomy and private law.29 The latter may integrate the political decision-making initiated by the former, but is not allowed to totally take its place and initiate that decision-making by itself.30
A question arises here about which role should be reserved to the
State.
It should not be called to act as a regulator in detail of individual
behaviour, but rather as an overall system architect, intervening before
and after self-regulation. Ex ante, the State will define the general rules,
the goals to be pursued, the values to be fulfilled. Ex post, it will be in
the State’s responsibility to correct any deviation of private regulations
from the rules it has preliminarily set.
More specifically, the relative weight of heteronomy upon selfregulation will grow together with the capacity of the negotiated law to
seek erga-omnes effects extending its application to a wider community
than the one which it directly represents,31 In such a case it will fall upon the State to look into the structure and the organization of the private
subjects in order that an adequate representativeness, transparency, and
democratic decision-making processes may be insured.32 The necessity
for the State to intervene is given by the substantial equivalence between private regulation and a properly legal source of law.
Conclusively, in a correct order, law comes first, self-regulation
follows. If the order is inverted, the inherently secondary nature of selfregulation with respect to the law will be merely fictitious.33 Selfregulation will absorb a substantial law-making role and will be applied
as a fully legal source of law. Damages to the constitutional architecture
will be inevitable.
Nevertheless, it may happen that the correct relationship between
Law), Cedam, Padova, II ed., 2015, pp, 31-32.
29. See generally W. Cesarini Sforza & Salvatore Romano, Il Diritto Dei Privati [The Law
of Privates], in 5 CIVILTÀ DEL DIRITTO [CIVILIZATION OF LAW] (1963).
30. See generally De Minico, A Hard Look, supra note 13, at 197-200 (discussing the relationship between binding and consensual law).
31. Black, supra note 6, at 30, 32. With specific reference to the Internet, see Jonathan Cave,
Policy and regulatory requirements for a future Internet, IN RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
GOVERNANCE OF THE INTERNET 161 (2013).
32. ROLF H. WEBER ET AL., SHAPING INTERNET GOVERNANCE: REGULATORY
CHALLENGES 105 (2009); see also, JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE
INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD 17 (2006).
33. A detailed analysis may be found in a previous work of mine – GIOVANNA DE MINICO,
REGOLE. COMANDO E CONSENSO 125 (2005) (It.). Chapter four of that book is dedicated entirely
to this issue.
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heteronomy and self-regulation be subverted.34 France came close to it
during Sarkozy’s term in office35 due to the President’s belief that selfregulation would be the cure for all the ills of the Internet. 36 If in following such a myth a full control of the internet should be vested upon private interest governments,37 a corporativistic involution of the net would
inevitably ensue. The rules would be shaped in close accordance with
those private economic interests.
A reference to net neutrality38 is also in order. A conflict is under
way between two competing rights. On one hand, the right of Broadband providers to sell the access to the Internet at different prices; on
the other, the consumers’ right to choose services, devices, applications
and contents in accordance of their taste and regardless of connection
speed. This is the basic playground of what is generally defined as net
neutrality, and offers a good test for the relationship between heteronomy and self regulation.
In the U.S.A the conflict has fostered two different answers. The
first one entrusts a public body, i.e. the Federal Communication Commission (hereinafter F.C.C.), 39 with a light regulation requiring broadband providers not to block access, degrade, or favor any legal content,
applications, services, or non-harmful devices over others. The second
one remits to the negotiations between the broadband provider and the
34. See MARSDEN, supra note 24, at 58.
35. See, N. Sarkozy, Opening of the eG8 Forum: Address by Nicolas Sarkozy, President of
the
French
Republic,
May
24,
2011,
Paris,
at
http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2011deauville/eg8/eg8-sarkozy-en.html.
Among newspapers’ articles, see: K.WILLSHER, Sarkozy opens ‘historic’ forum on future of internet in runup to G8, at http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/may/24/sarkozy-opens-eg8-summit; E.P Fannermay, G-8 Leaders to Call for Tighter Internet Regulation, 24, 2011, at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/25/technology/25tech.html?_r=1
36. For contrasting approaches by the U.S. and France, see G8 Summit, Deauville G8 Declaration Renewed Commitment for Freedom and Democracy (May 26-27, 2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/deauville_declaration_final_-_eng_8h.pdf.
37. See Wolfgang Streeck & Philippe C. Schmitter, Community, market, state – and associations? The prospective contribution of interest governance to social order, in PRIVATE
INTEREST GOVERNMENT BEYOND MARKET AND STATE 16 (Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe C.
Schmitter eds., 1985).
38. A clear and comprehensive definition of the net neutrality was given by the Federal
Communication Commission. See Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, 25
FCC Rcd. 17905, 17906 (2010), available at https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC10-201A1_Rcd.pdf [hereinafter Preserving the Open Internet]. For a recent synthesis, see
KENNETH C. CREECH, ELECTRONIC MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION 351(Routledge 6th ed. 2014).
39. See Federal Communications Commission, REPORT AND ORDER. ACT TO PRESERVE
INTERNET FREEDOM AND OPENNESS, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10201A1_Rcd.pdf; The Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Robert M. McDowell may be found
at http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2012/db0822/FCC-12-92A3.pdf.
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content provider the quality and speed of the connection. In such a case,
the negotiation is incompatible with the consumer’s right to a free
choice, and therefore, a right to the net in a strict sense does not exist
anymore.
On the question of what net neutrality should be, the FCC has repeatedly spoken on, and has recently launched, a rulemaking procedure
on how best an open Internet can be protected and promoted.40 The
opening question was: “[w]hat is the right public policy to ensure that
the Internet remains open?” Two options were set forth. The first one
was to maintain the existing regulatory approach. Under the second one,
the cable and phone companies would be required to provide a basic
and equal level of unfettered Internet service to their broadband subscribers, beyond which they would be allowed to charge different fees
for a faster delivery to consumers. It was objected that the second option
allowing the distinction between basic and premium offerings would
have divided the Internet into the “haves” and the “have-nots”.
The first solution has finally prevailed41: a really open Internet
governed by public rules resistant to the economic interests of broadband providers. However, this querelle should be considered still
open.42
The examples made so far show a self-regulation secondary to
binding law. But they also show a pluralistic environment of which selfregulation is a necessary element. Teubner’s theory43 on porous law may
be recalled here. The basic assumption is that the State is unable to keep

40. See FCC LAUNCHES BROAD RULEMAKING ON HOW BEST TO PROTECT AND PROMOTE
OPEN
INTERNET,
FCC
(May
15,
2014),
available
at
http://www.fcc.gov/document/protecting-and-promoting-open-internet-nprm.
We can note that the Obama Administration took a cautious stand to this conflict. Haley Sweetland Edwards, Obama Backs Away From Net Neutrality Campaign Promises After FCC Vote,
TIME (May 15, 2014), http://time.com/101794/obama-backs-away-from-net-neutrality-campaignpromises-after-fcc-vote/.
41. See Federal Communications Commission, STRONG, SUSTAINABLE RULES TO
PROTECT
THE
OPEN
INTERNET,
February
26,
2015,
at
http://www.arentfox.com/sites/default/files/DOC-302200A1.pdf
42. The FCC decision was taken with a narrow three-two majority and the opposing commissioners made it clear they would keep fighting against the decision.
With regards to the matter see: Rudy Takala, Seven Lawsuits Now Pending Against FCC Over
‘Net Neutrality’ Rule, at http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/rudy-takala/seven-lawsuits-nowpending-against-fcc-over-net-neutrality-rule; JOSH TAYLOR, Net neutrality decision ‘monumentally flawed’: FCC commissioner, at http://www.zdnet.com/article/net-neutrality-decisionmonumentally-flawed-fcc-commissioner/.
43. See GUNTHER TEUBNER ET AL., LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM 100, 139-140 (Ruth
Adler trans., 1993).
THE
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an effective monopoly of lawmaking. It therefore acknowledges its own
limitations, allowing other subjects44 the power to write rules for individual and collective behaviors which are subsequently taken up as part
of the legal system. This is the theory of reflexive law, which correctly
describes the experience of modern legal systems, although attention
must be paid to avoiding some possible excesses.45 Reflexive law finds
an appropriate structural solution in a pluralistic architecture in which a
higher-level legal system – the State – encompasses one or more autonomous legal subsystems, which exist and operate within the limits established by the former.46 In this perspective the subsystems are necessarily secondary to the higher-level legal system, and the role of private
subjects may be differently defined as far as scope, procedures, effects
are concerned. A French author has depicted the private contribution as
limited to the “mise en oeuvre des politiques publiques” (the implementation of public policies).47 In any case, the State maintains a full
authority48 and a final word on the system as a whole, although relinquishing the role of exclusive lawmaker,
The circle is now complete: political decision-makers and public
powers should keep their leadership in the self-regulating processes, intervening with ex ante determination of its goals, and ex-post control
and correction.
A measure of heteronomous regulation is necessary. But a question
is open: which should the scope and content of this regulation be?
As far as the Internet is concerned, the starting point is found in the
44. See A Hard Look, supra note 15, at 198 (“Hence, private associations must promote policies adjusting self-regulation from the beginning to social purposes . . . and the State claims ‘the
chance of political decision’ though respecting ‘the organised power to act of social bodies.”).
45. See Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 239, 278 (1982-1983) [hereinafter Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern
Law]; see generally GUNTHER TEUBNER & ALBERTO FEBBRAJO, STATE, LAW, AND ECONOMY
AS AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEMS, (Dott. A. Giuffré ed., 1992); see also GUNTHER TEUBNER,
DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE WELFARE STATE, (Walter de Gruyter ed., 1986); and see RENATE
MAYNYZ, STEUERUNG, STEUERUNGSAKTEURE UND STEUERENGSINSTRUMENTE: ZUR
PRÄZISIERUNG DES PROBLEMS (CONTROL, CONTROL ACTORS AND STEUERENGSINSTRUMENTE:
TO CLARIFY THE PROBLEMS) 24, 70 (1986).
46. Walter L. Bühl, Grenzen der Autopoiesis [Limits of autopoeiesis], in 39 KÖLNER
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR SOZIOLOGIE UND SOZIALPSYCHOLOGIE 247 (1987).
47. Charles-Albert Morand, La contractualisation corporatiste de la formation et de la mise
en oeuvre du droit [The corporatist contracting training and implementation of the law], in
L’ETAT PROPULSIF. CONTRIBUTION À L’ETUDE DESINSTRUMENTS D’ACTION D’ETAT [STATE
PROPULSION CONTRIBUTION TO THE STUDY INSTRUMENTS ACTION STATE] 207 (Charles Albert
ed., 1991).
48. THE REGULATION OF CYBERSPACE, supra note 3, at 250-251.
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Courts’ decisions – both the European Court of Human Rights49 and the
U.S. Supreme Court50 – affirming that rules should be specifically suited
to their object. Therefore, offline media regulations cannot as such be
made applicable online.51 Should this happen, the Internet would lose its
uniqueness. Furthermore, an unfettered Internet is essential to the circulation of ideas which is a basic instrument of economic and social
growth.52 As a consequence, regulations should be kept at a minimum
level.
Regulation of the Internet is thus faced with the supreme value of
the marketplace of ideas53 resembling a transposition of the economic
theory of laissez-faire on the ground of an exchange of immaterial
goods. Freedom of speech imposes itself as the unique and real cornerstone of democracy. As a result, it is reasonable to assume that “governmental regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere
with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it.” 54 As the Supreme
Court stated in the ACLU the assumption that in a democratic society
censorship may prove beneficial is “theoretical but unproven.” 55
For the first time in the history of mankind, billions of people can
easily communicate and share information through the Internet, and
there can be no overwhelming public or private interest justifying the
substantial curtailment of the Internet’s effectiveness. Therefore, a basic
principle can be drawn stating that a regulation of the Internet, even
when required should be kept as light and unobtrusive as possible.

49. Animal Defenders Int. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 48876/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013)
(forthcoming in European Human Rights Review).
50. Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
51. The United State Supreme Court has recognized that the “differences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them.” Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133, 135-36 (9th Cir. 1971) (citation omitted);
see, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420
U.S. 546, 557 (1975); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637-38 (1994); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128
(1989).
52. See Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/40 (Apr. 17, 2013) (Frank La
Rue),
available
at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session23/A.HRC.23.4
0_EN.pdf, in which the author exposes serious concerns for the practices adopted by many States
aimed at keeping the Internet under close surveillance and control.
53. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Wendell, J., dissenting).
54. Reno, 521 U.S. at 885.
55. Id.
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III. WHY SHOULD THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE INTERNET BE
NECESSARY?

With a general framework for the internet drawn up, one question
remains: is it then necessary to update those national Constitutions that
do not mention the Internet at all?
As a starting point, three Constitutions—namely the Italian, French
and American ones—will be discussed, as they already entail norms
protecting traditional media - radio, television, and newspapers - yet at
the same time lack specific rules for online media such as Internet blogs
and social network websites.56
More specifically, in the Italian Constitution art. 15 (freedom of
communication) and art. 21 (freedom of speech)57 do not refer to the Internet at all. This is easily explained considering that the constitutional
formulas have remained unchanged since 1948. Recently, there has
been considerable debate among scholars about the necessity of introducing new ad hoc provisions58 through a constitutional reform.
It can be argued against the thesis of a formal revision that any
new formula would be focused on the existing technology, and could
not easily cover the inevitable and unforeseeable future developments.
This would expose any constitutional innovation to the risk of
premature obsolescence: a detailed provision might be useful today, but
useless, or even harmful, tomorrow. It should be further noted that the
56. Only two Constitutions dealt with new media through explicit provisions, see 2008
SYNTAGMA [SYN.][CONSTITUTION] 5a, co.2 (Greece) and CONSTITUCION DE REPÚBLICA DEL
ECUADOR [C.R] art. 16.
57. See Art. 15 Constituzione [Cost.] (It.) (“Freedom and confidentiality of correspondence
and of every other form of communication is inviolable. Limitations may only be imposed by
judicial decision stating the reasons and in accordance with the guarantees provided by the law.”).
Article 21, the only article relevant here, states: “Anyone has the right to freely express their
thoughts in speech, writing, or any other form of communication.” Id. art. 21.
58. Concerning the previous Leg. XVI, see the “disegno di legge costituzionale, A.S. n.
2475, 6/12/2010, at http://www.senato.it/leg/16/BGT/Schede/Ddliter/36202.htm [hereinafter Project of constitutional law 2475/2010]. Among scholars, see Stefano Rodotà, Il mondo della rete.
Quali diritti e quali vincoli [THE WORLD IN THE NET. WHAT RIGHTS AND WHAT CONSTRAINTS]
(2014).
Concerning the current Leg. XVII, see the “disegno di legge costituzionale, A.S. 1317, 17/2/2014,
at http://www.senato.it/leg/17/BGT/Schede/Ddliter/43981.htm [hereinafter Project of constitutional law 1317/2014] and also the “disegno di legge costituzionale, A.S. 1561, 10/7/2014, at
http://www.senato.it/leg/17/BGT/Schede/Ddliter/44665.htm [hereinafter Project of constitutional
law 1561/2014]. In doctrine see: O.Pollicino, ‘Esame in sede referente dei DDL 1317 e 1561
(diritto di accesso ad Internet)’, at http://www.medialaws.eu/esame-in-sede-referente-dei-ddl1317-e-1561-diritto-di-accesso-ad-internet/ and G. De Minico, ‘A proposito dei disegni di legge
di revisione costituzionale, A.S. 1561 e 1317, I Commissione del Senato, Leg. XVII, 10/3/2015’
(forthcoming).
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real focus of Internet regulation is found—as it will be explained more
extensively later—in the identification of a supranational rule-maker. A
national Constitution, applicable within the territory of a single State,
might be an obstacle in the broader perspective of a discipline that encompasses a number of States with different legislative histories, experiences, and economic and social interests. From this point of view, a
specific and detailed constitutional provision might not be the right answer.
An alternative is found in adopting a broad interpretation of the existing constitutional provision, in order that they may be applied to the
new virtual reality.59
This approach would be made easier by the inherent flexibility of
many Constitutional provisions.60 This is the case of art. 15 and 21 of
the Italian Constitution, which grant protection to named media, but also refer respectively to “every other form of communication” (Art. 15)
and “any other means of communication” (Art. 21).61
A similar example is given by the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution,62 which has been construed in the sense that the Internet is
fully within the constitutional safeguards of the freedom of speech.63 No
reform of the Amendment has been deemed necessary.
The extension of the same constitutional protection to rights and
liberties offline and online does not imply an automatic transfer of the
offline discipline, as a whole, in the world of virtual reality. As it has
been argued previously, this would not be effective and would only undermine the uniqueness of the Internet. The extension considered here is
limited to the basic constitutional guarantees of rights and liberties,
while a different sub-constitutional regulation may remain to be provid-

59. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitution in Cyberspace: Law and Liberty Beyond the
Electronic
Frontier,
Electronic
Privacy
Information
Center
(1991),
at
http://epic.org/free_speech/tribe.html.
60. On the issue of the flexible structure of many Constitutional provisions see GIUSTIZIA
CONSTITUZIONALE 246 (Gustavo Zagrebelsky & Valeria Marceno eds., 2012).
61. Arts. 15, 21 Constituzione [Cost.] (It.). This is a typical example of a flexible provision.
The interpreter should be able to read it as encompassing new forms or means of communication
previously unheard of, made available by technological innovation. This text remains unchanged
while staying adherent to new conditions.
62. Among the first on the elasticity of the text and the discretionary power, Justice Harlan
stated, “I do not see why Congress should not be able as well to exercise its ‘discretion’ by enacting statutes so as in effect to dilute equal protection and due process decisions of this Court.”
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 669 (1966); see also JONATHAN D. VARAT ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1184 (1997).
63. See supra note 51.
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ed in detail. This point will be made clear by a closer look at the Italian
and U.S. Constitutions, with different specific provisions but, similar
problems posed by the new virtual reality.
A. From the “law clause” to the “rule of law” of the international
system
I shall start by examining the basic safeguards provided by the Italian Constitution for fundamental rights and liberties offline.
In the Italian Constitution a basic guarantee of rights and liberties
is found in the law clause (“riserva di legge”),64 by which a primary legislative rule must be adopted first,65 while a secondary rule may be
adopted subsequently and only within limits necessarily defined by the
former.66 In matters concerning copyright and the Internet, Legislative
Decree n. 44/201067does not comply with this principle, vesting upon
the Authority for the Guarantee of Communication,68 a general responsibility, without defining in detail the Authority’s powers. In the absence of a specific legislative foundation, the Authority itself (Deliberation N. 680/13/CONS)69 has assumed to have the power of closing
websites or requiring that some contents be cancelled, following a
summary assessment of their illicit nature .The Authority’s decision is a
secondary source, and therefore in virtue of the “law clause” is not allowed to introduce an original innovation in the legal system without an
adequate foundation in a primary source.70 Consequently, the compli64. G. ZAGREBELSKY, Il sistema costituzionale delle fonti del diritto, (The constitutional
system of the law sources) (Torino: Giappichelli, 1984) 84-87; also L. Carlassare, I regolamenti
dell’Esecutivo e principio di legalità [The rules of the Government and the legality principle]
(Padova: Cedam, 1966) 223; E. Cheli, Potere regolamentare e struttura costituzionale [Regulation power and Constitutional structure] (Milano: Giuffrè, 1977) 50
65. A primary source is construed by the Italian doctrine as a regulatory will expressed by a
constitutional power specifically vested with political functions. This source has the basic task to
define and initiate the policy project that will be developed by the secondary sources (see for all
the clear pages written by V. CRISAFULLI, Lezioni di diritto costituzionale (Lessons of constitutional law), 2nd vol., (Padova: Cedam, 1993), 140-159.
66. Because of this secondary nature, some scholars have stated that in force of the legality
principle, a previous provision of law conferring a blank power to the secondary source is not
sufficient. The law must intervene indicating the aim, the scope, and the guidelines with which
the secondary power is required to comply. So G.U. Rescigno, ‘Sul principio di legalita’ [Around
the legality principle]19 (1995) Dir. Pubbl., pp. 264-265.
67. Decreto Legislativo 15 marzo 2010, n. 44, in G.U. 29 marzo 2010, n. 73 (It.)
68. From now on: A.G.Com.
69. Delibera
N.
680/13/CONS
[Deliberation
n.
680/13/CONS],
at
http://www.agcom.it/default.aspx?DocID=12228
70. G. De Minico, ‘Indipendenza delle autorità o indipendenza dei regolamenti? Lettura in
parallelo all’esperienza comunitaria’ (Independence of the Authorities or independence of the
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ance with the law clause and the hierarchy principle of both the Legislative Decree 44/2010 and the Authority’s Deliberation may be questioned.
The Italian case may recall the French law Hadopi 1, 71 by which a
decision-making power upon websites is given to an independent authority.72 In a comparative context, a safeguard for the protection of human rights substantially equivalent but not identical to the Italian Constitution’s “law clause”73 may be found in the “rule of law”.74 This
means that the discipline of fundamental rights must be prescribed by a
law that is “adequately accessible”75 and “formulated with sufficient
precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct.”76 A close scrutiny reveals a notable difference between the international principle and
the Italian clause. In the perspective of the “rule of law”, the secondary
sources are usually allowed a much wider access to regulation.77 Not onregulations? A comparative reading with the European experience), in M. D’Amico e B. Randazzo (eds) , Alle frontiere del diritto costituzionale (At the borders of constitutional law. Works in
honour of Valerio Onida (Milan: Giuffré, 2011) 731-733.
71. La Protection Pénale de la Propriété Littéraire et Artistique sur Internet [The Criminal
Protection of Literary and Artistic Property on the Internet]JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Oct. 28, 2009, p. 18290, avialable
at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000021208046&categorieLie
n=id.
72. In the case under examination, the conflict arises between the copyright – the author’s
right to his intellectual property—and everyone’s right to be informed. Clearly unequal values are
compared: one financial, and the other, a fundamental right. The latter, which would not be comparable with a value of a different nature in principle, is de facto widely sacrificed by both the
French and Italian laws in favor of the right to an economic exploitation of intellectual work. Another flaw can be found considering that in this case, the measure of coexistence between conflicting values is a basic political issue. Therefore, it cannot be wholly entrusted to an authority,
Court or I.R.A., and should be vested primarily upon a representative and politically responsible
legislator.
73. See for examples of law clause the First Part ( Parte I), First Title ( Titolo I) of the Italian Constitution for the examples of the law clause.
74. The literature concerning the “rule of law” is unlimited. For present comparative purposes it is sufficient to refer to scholarly contributions based on recent case law developments;
see, among others, FEDERICO FABBRINI, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE: CHALLENGES AND
TRANSFORMATIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1st ed. 2014); DAMIAN CHALMERS ET AL.,
EUROPEAN UNION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 256-58 (3d ed. 2014); DAVID HARRIS ET AL.,
LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 345-349 (2009). While for the specific
sector of the media freedom see: HELEN FENWICK & GAVIN PHILLIPSON, MEDIA FREEDOM
UNDER THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 37-311 (2006).
75. Silver v. United Kingdom, 5 Eur H.R. Rep. 372 (¶ 87) (1980).
76. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 245, 271 (¶ 49) (1980).
77. Well said by David Harris, Michael O’Boyle, & Edward Bates in LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 344 (2d ed.2009): “the rule need not be a rule of
domestic law but may be a rule of international law or Community law so long as it purports to
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ly are the Assembly’s legislative acts allowed to intervene, but the decisions from the public authority (containing general and abstract provisions) are permitted to as well.78
The rule of law can therefore be summarized as upholding fundamental rights against the public powers’ arbitrary decisions 79 in spite of
its legal form, be it an act issued by the Parliament or by the Government.80 This principle strengthens the protection of rights, namely in
preventing the violation of liberties that may arise from a Parliamentary
act, which does not comply with the standards of generality and abstractness.81 Conversely, the same principle weakens this protection by
allowing a secondary source to set out the discipline without any previous legislative intervention.
B. From the “jurisdictional clause” to the due process
Fundamental rights and liberties online can find within the Italian
Constitution a second basic safeguard in the jurisdictional clause
(“riserva di giurisdizione”, as explained elsewhere). This “riserva”, applying the principle of separation of powers,82 entrust the power of judicial review solely upon the judiciary.
The Italian Constitution provides a strong protection for the independence of the judiciary. No political or administrative body is allowed
to interfere with judicial functions,83 which must be carried on by excluauthorize the interference. It may consist of a whole legal regime regulating the area of activity,
including rules made by a delegated rule-making authority (Barthold v FRG A90 (1985); 7 EHRR
383 pagas 45-6 (1985) and rules from more than one legal order.” See also DANIEL MOECKLI ET
AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 111 (2010).
78. Silver, 5 Eur H.R. Rep. at 372. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep.
271(¶ 47) (1979). For further doctrine examples, See HELEN FENWICK & GAVIN PHILLIPSON,
MEDIA FREEDOM UNDER THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 47 (2006).
79. Kruslin v. France (1990) 1 EHRR 562, para. 30.
80. See Draft charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Brussel, 8 March
2000 (13.03), a preview of what will then become Art. 53 of the Charter: «According to the
European Conventions of Human Rights, the term ‘law’ must be understood in the material
not the formal sense. It can cover sub-legislative, customary or case of law standard».
81. See generally Robert S. Summers, A Formal Theory of the Rule of Law, RATIO JURIS
(1993).
82. For the purpose of this essay, a general definition of the principle of separation of powers will be adequate: a more or less rigid division of power between the Legislative, the Executive
and the Judiciary aimed at the essential checks and balances required by democracy. For a supranational analysis beyond specific States, see CHRISTOPH MOELLERS, THE THREE
BRANCHES: A COMPARATIVE MODEL OF SEPARATION OF POWERS 150 (2013).
83. On the guaranteed independence of the judiciary power see, among the others: R. Guastini, ‘Commento all’art. 101’, at G. Branca-A. Pizzorusso (eds), Commentario della Costituzione.
La magistratura, vol. Ist, (Bologna-Roma, 1994) 172; F. Bartole, Autonomia e indipendenza
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sively applying the law. This independence is the basic reason why only
a judge is allowed to limit fundamental rights and liberties in compliance with the law. One can see here that the jurisdictional clause and the
law clause work in synergy.
For this reason, a strong dissent should be expressed against 84 the
Italian Legislative Decree n. 44/2010.
The constitutionality of the Decree can be challenged on several
grounds, one of which is found in the lack of compliance with the jurisdictional clause. The power to “clean” the websites, ordering that a specific content be cancelled, is entrusted to an independent regulatory authority. Since such an order inevitably affects the freedom of speech, a
constitutionally sound solution would require a court proceeding and a
judicial decision. The Decree’s provision may recall the French law
Hadopi 1, before the decision of the Conseil Constitutionnel and the
subsequent modifications.
On an international level, the jurisdictional clause is present. In the
European Court of Human Rights’ decisions, for instance, it is in the
weaker form of due process.85 In fact the European Convention on Human Rights (especially, Articles. 5-6) does not force EU Member States
to confer power, as detailed above, only to a judge.86 Different authoridell’ordine giudiziario (Padova: Cedam 1964); C. Mezzanotte, ‘Sulla nozione d’indipendenza del
giudice’, at B. Caravita di Toritto (ed), Magistratura, CSM e principi costituzionali (Bari: Laterza
1994); A. Pizzorusso, ‘La Corte costituzionale ed il principio di indipendenza del giudice’, at
Scritti su la giustizia costituzionale in onore di Vezio Crisafulli (Padova: Cedam, 1985).
84. Giovanna De Minico, Libertà e copyright nella Costituzione e nel Diritto dell’Unione
(January 2014) [Fundamental Rights and Copyright in Italian Constitution and in the European
System], available at http://www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it/articolorivista/libert-ecopyright-nella-costituzione-e-nel-diritto-dell-unione (last visited Mar. 4, 2015) [hereinafter De
Minico, Fundamental Rights and Copyright].
For a sharp critique, see M. Avvisati, ‘Diritto d’autore in rete e Costituzione: concerto tra le
fonti?’, 3 (2014) at http://www.osservatoriosullefonti.it/component/docman/cat_view/199-note-ecommenti.
Pending the publication of this essay, the Decree was challenged on the grounds illustrated above
before the Constitutional Court, see: Tar Lazio, sez.I n. 10016 /2014 and n.10020/2014, at
http://www.neldiritto.it/appgiurisprudenza.asp?id=10792#.VWYGbc_tmko
85. Being this topic only partially connected to our study it is enough here to refer to the
same scholars quoted at note n. 87.
86. The concept of “judge” or “tribunal” is interpreted by the E.C.H.R. in an autonomous
manner. In fact, in the Ringeisen case (ECHR, 16 July 1971, Ringeisen –Austria (Series A-16),
parag. 94-95) the Court had to decide whether article six was applicable in an Austrian dispute
concerning the purchase of property. The Court held that the administrative character of the Authority was of little consequence, so it concluded that the body was a “tribunal.” In doctrine for
all: F. Matscher, ‘La notion de ‘tribunal’ au sens de la Convention européenne des droit de
l’homme’, in R. Koering-Jouklin, Les nouveaux développements du procès équitable au sens de
la Convention européenne des droit de l’homme (Brussels: Bruylant, 1996), 33.
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ties may be entrusted with the implementation of legal rules, provided
that their decisions are based upon a fair hearing and a reasonable motivation.87
What matters here is that the act concretely imposing limits will
be adopted in an adversarial proceeding, allowing those who must
bear those limits to have prompt knowledge of them in order to make
their opposing arguments heard. And, should the relevant Authority,
after the resolution of the conflicting issues, be convinced of the validity and truth of those limits, it will have to make the iter of its decision understandable to all. 88 Therefore, the interference with the
peaceful enjoyment of one’s assets is accompanied by procedural
guarantees ensuring a reasonable opportunity to make one’s case before the competent authorities. 89
This approach is considered a somewhat weaker one, as independence, impartiality, and neutrality - essential requisites for a fair assessment of the parties’ dispute – are, in principle, more fully ensured by
judges, although in different ways in different States.
After examining the essential framework of the constitutional protection of rights and liberties in the Italian legal system, as well as in a
comparative perspective, it is necessary to state a point: the underlying
assumptions may be deemed valid for any legal system. As Fuller points
out, laws must comply with some basic requirements, ensuring at least
their legitimacy and efficiency. 90 In this perspective, the existence of a
territorial location may not be relevant. It can therefore be argued that
the same framework applies to rights and liberties wherever they are exercised. Their nature or scope does not change when they move to the
virtual world of the Internet, nor do they become any less fundamental.
87. The ECHR has developed its own substantive requirements for a “tribunal.” In particular, the body must have the power of decision; operate on the basis of rules of law and after proceedings conducted in a prescribed manner; determine matters within its competence; motivate its
decisions and be independent and impartial. See MARTIN KUIJER, THE BLINDFOLD OF LADY
JUSTICE: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY IN LIGHT OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF
ARTICLE 6 ECHR 175 (2004).
88. This is the case of the Independent Administrative Authorities. As I noted in a previous
essay, although they do not belong to the judiciary power, they must motivate their decisions in
order to allow a judicial review be conducted over them. G. DE MINICO, INDIPENDENZA DELLE
AUTORITA O INDIPENDENZA DEI REGOLAMENTI? LETTURA IN PARALLELO ALL’ESPERIENZA
COMUNITARIA’ [INDEPENDENCE OF THE AUTHORITIES OR INDEPENDENCE OF THE REGULATIONS?
A COMPARATIVE READING WITH THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE],731(2011) [hereinafter De Minico, A Comparative Reading].
89. The case law of the Eur. Ct. H.R. is synthesized in the decision of Agosi v. United
Kingdom, 9 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 55 (1986).
90. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 152-184 (1969).
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The basic function of constitutional safeguards, aimed at preventing any
breach of those rights, is equally confirmed. For example, freedom of
speech in an online blog should be protected against ex ante controls as
it is the case with the written speech of a book. In both cases the speech
is addressed to an indefinite number of people and a similar damage
would ensue from curtailing a speaker’s freedom. Therefore, no rational
foundation may be indicated for a different definition or implementation
of the constitutional framework.
IV. FROM THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE INTERNET TO AN
INTERNET BILL OF RIGHTS
I started my discourse by denying the need for a formal modification of the Constitutions in order to encompass the Internet. Significant
similarities can be found in a compared reading of the North American
and the European systems. It may now be useful to take a further step in
stating the necessity of an “Internet Bill of Rights”.91
Regulations of the Internet have so far been discussed through underlining some common elements following a comparative perspective.
It is this author’s argument that a global and rapidly changing reality
shows a highly fragmented picture. More specifically, the mosaic of
multiple State net regulations, filtered through widely different social,
economic, and political conditions in different territories, cannot effectively keep such a fast pace. Even more, the a-territorial nature of the
Internet radically clashes per se with the limitations imposed by State
boundaries.92 This suggests the increasing necessity of a set of basic
rules that can be both generally accepted and acknowledged as a primary, binding source of law for all those public or private subjects interacting with the Internet.
There are a number of fundamental rights and liberties that already
enjoy a constitutional protection in different legal systems, even in the
absence of specific provisions concerning the Internet.93 But undoubtedly the Internet goes nowadays well beyond freedom of speech and
communication, crucial as they may be in a democratic society. The In-

91. Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 Emory L.J. 3, 7-18
(1996).
92. Allow me to refer to my analysis delivered in one of my books: INTERNET. REGOLA O
ANARCHIA, quoted, p. 8.
93. This issue has already been dealt with at the beginning of this essay, where the only two
Constitutions, containing explicit provisions for the Internet have been mentioned see supra note
56.
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ternet appears more and more as the most powerful tool ever forged for
social inclusion and economic growth, which is exactly why the digital
divide should be considered a decisive factor of inequality among countries and individuals. Such a scenario suggests that a conclusive and satisfactory answer cannot be found in the interpretation—broad as it may
be—of some constitutional provisions written at a time when there was
no awareness of this new reality.
This global situation does indeed urge a proper “Internet Bill of
Rights”. In doing so, another question is then raised: who is the constituent power of the Internet? In other words: which Authority shall be legitimated94 to write the fundamental Charter of the Internet?
It is clear from what I said before that the hypothesis of one or
more national States assuming such a role must be rejected.95 The aterritorial nature of the Internet would be incompatible with an Authority entrusted with powers constrained within State boundaries. 96 The features of the Internet require, as stated above, that only a supranational
legislator should be called upon to write its Constitution. Even so, one
question remains open: should such a legislator be an international body
through an authoritative hard-law regulation, or should it rather be the
community of Internet ‘surfers’ through self-regulation? The former
have frequently proven to be unable to build the consensus necessary to
condense and shape the common good in a supranational synthesis. 97
Furthermore, they fall easily under the influence of strong national
States, the interests of which only occasionally coincide with a broader
common good.98 In brief, international organizations tend to reproduce,
albeit on a smaller scale, the basic flaw of world politics, a system of interactions between autonomous nation-States at best. In this framework,

94. RUDOLF W. RIJGERSBERG, The State of Interdependence. Globalization, Internet and
Constitutional Governance 49-68 & 213-30 (Hague: Asser Press, 2010).
95. See infra
96. CHRIS REED, MAKING LAWS FOR CYBERSPACE 30-34 (2012).
97. See Teubner G., Constitutional Fragments, 66.
98. There is no unanimous definition of the “common good.” For example: W. Streeck - P.
C. Schmitter, Community, market, state – and associations? The prospective contribution of interest governance to social order, quoted, 16, strongly believes in “the public use of private interest governments [. . .] which are made subservient to general interests by appropriately designed
institutions”. On the contrary, C. A. MORAND, La contractualisation corporatiste de la formation
et de la mise en oeuvre du droit, in L’ETAT PROPULSIF. CONTRIBUTION A L’ETUDE DES
INSTRUMENTS D’ACTION DE L’ETAT 209 (Paris: Publisud, 1991), states that “L’éclatement de
l’intérêt général en une multitude d’intérêts particuliers et sectorialisés remet en cause l’une des
justifications fondamentale de l’exercise du pouvoir étatique, son orientation vers la réalisation de
l’intérêt public. »
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international organizations have revealed themselves incapable to replace the culture of nation-States with a new one.
Therefore, the idea of an Internet Bill of Right written by its own
people, entrusting regulation to an endogenous process of selforganization, might gain some ground. Effective examples can be offered by institutions such as ICANN, 99 courts of arbitration, or international standardization organizations such as the World Wide Web Consortium. This is a better solution as to the need of effective supranationality. New problems, however, arise, since it refers to a plurality
of subjects not yet transformed into a body formally vested with authoritative powers.100
Considering the current situation, the risk of a “corporate constitutionalism” cannot be overlooked.101 As Teubner stated, such a risk is inherent whenever well-structured and significantly funded private bodies
enter the field.102 The Internet may very well be the “most prominent
case of constitutional law created through multinational corporations
private ordering.”103 And even if all stereotypes should be refused, corporate constitutionalism will undoubtedly be accompanied by “the
glimmering of the constitution of multi-national enterprises as an autonomous community of entities that have begun to regulate themselves
through the construction of systems of governance independent of the
states.”104
The risk underlined by Teubner should not be underestimated. A
private interest government, to use an expression familiar to some
scholars,105 is entrusted with social tasks if it enacts regulations affecting
not only their associates, but also third parties. This is not the case of a
regulatory power bestowed on the decision makers through a contractu99. About ICANN governance see: M. Hutter, Global regulation of the Internet domaine
name system: five lessons from the ICANN Case, in Karl-Heinz Ladeur (ed), [Innovationsoffene
Regulierung des Internet:Neues Recht für Kommunikationsnetzwerke] (Baden-Baden: Nomos,
2003), 39-52.
The French delegation to ICANN’s 50th meeting, taking place in London, recently stated that
“U.S.-based ICANN is unfit for ‘Internet governance’”:
100. CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 69-79 (2001).
101. G. TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
GLOBALIZATION 56 (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2012).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Larry Cata Backer, The Autonomous Global Enterprise: On the Role of Organizational
Law Beyond Asset Partitioning and Legal Personality, 41 TULSA L. REV. 541, 567 (2006).
105. See Wolfgang Streeck & Philippe C. Schmitter, Community, Market, State—and Associations? The Prospective Contribution of Interest Governance to Social Order, 1 EUR. SOC. REV.
119, 127 (1985) available at http://esr.oxfordjournals.org/content/1/2/119.full.pdf.
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al obligation where members involved accept the rules. Instead, were a
private interest government to enact and enforce those rules applicable
to everyone working in the field beyond the relevant social group of
stipulating members, a basic issue of democracy arises. In such cases,
the consensus within the social group will not give the regulator an adequate and proper basis to adopt acts affecting third parties per se. The
issues of representativeness and democratic governance are paramount,
as they ultimately define the interaction among the conflicting interests
underlying the rules to be drawn.106
Therefore, I propose a median hypothesis. First, the legislative
power should be vested in a public supranational authoritative body,
based on legal and binding provisions, which also defines the nature and
scope of its powers. Second, the decision-making process of such a
body should encompass a strong representation of private interests concerning the Internet such as entrepreneurs, web surfers, and consumers.
The basic model could be drawn to resemble the notice and comment
procedure, well-known to the American experience in the field of regulations.107 Opposing stakeholders should discuss basic issues before a
public authority, who is able to make the final decision after the different views have been listened to and fully taken into account. The problems of standing and those concerning the choice of interests to be admitted to such a procedure have been extensively explored by the
American doctrine, which could be a reference on this point.108
The model proposed here would answer the questions on rule
maker legitimacy as it would be based on formally legal provisions. It
would also offer at least a partial answer to the doubts aroused by the
possibility that the supranational body be captured by the interests of the
stronger national States participating in its decisions. Such a risk is reduced by the fact that the private competing interests taking part in the
decision may formally have a territorial or national identity, but this will
not decisively affect their interests or policies.

106. LAURA DENARDIS, THE GLOBAL WAR FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE 230 (New HavenLondon: Yale University Press, 2014), focuses on the fact that the multi-stakeholder model isn’t
good per sé, unless it is based on the democratic values: amongst them, representativeness and
equilibrate balance of powers between public and private actors.
107. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
108. See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER, ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY
POLICY 869-881 4th ed. 1998); see Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV.
447 (1986); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking and the Administrative Procedure Act, 32
TULSA L.J. 185 (1996); and see Bernard Schwartz, Adjudication and the Administrative Procedure Act, 32 TULSA L.J. 203 (1996).
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The issue of a constituent power for the Internet may currently appear far-fetched, but it is actually something already in agenda, although
the attempts to reach a widespread consensus on some basic issues have
failed up to now as it has recently happened in Dubai109 and São Paulo.110
V. WHAT SHOULD THE ARCHITECTURE OF AN INTERNET BILL OF RIGHTS
BE LIKE?

Although the idea of a supranational constitutional legislator for
the Internet may appear unrealistic in the current situation, the need for
a set of commonly accepted basic rules is clear and immediately present. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a number of States can
reach an agreement on those basic rules. Several attempts have been and
are being made to this purpose.111 Should such an agreement be reached,
a set of substantially constitutional rules, binding each State in force of
an international treaty, would be laid down. Therefore, an analysis of
the contents of an Internet Bill – however formulated and enacted – de109. Int’l Telecomm. Union [ITU], Final Acts of the World Conference On International Telecommunications, I.T.U. 37779 (Dec. 3-14, 2012), available at http://www.itu.int/en/wcit12/Documents/final-acts-wcit-12.pdf.
110. Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance, NETmundial
Draft Outcome Document Public Consultation: final report on comments, (April 22, 2014),
available at http://netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NETmundialPublicConsultationFinalReport20140421.pdf [hereinafter NETmundial Internet Governance Report].
111. The recent Internet Governance Forum has moved in this direction, but without reaching
any results at the moment, Connecting Continents for Enhanced Multistakeholder Internet Governance, Istanbul-Turk., 2-5 September 2014, at http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf-2014.
Concerning the Italian experience, a recent and most significant development is found in the
Draft
Declaration
of
Internet
Rights
(http://www.camera.it/application/xmanager/projects/leg17/attachments/upload_file/upload_files/
000/000/189/dichiarazione_dei_diritti_internet_inglese.pdf) elaborated by a special Committee,
appointed by the president of the Chamber of Deputies (on. L. Boldrini)
(http://www.camera.it/leg17/1177). The Committee’s work is still in progress, and is intended to
provide the Italian Government with a technical and political basis for the promotion of promote
an International Bill of rights. The overall results achieved so far can be considered satisfactory,
although some provisions may appear to be insufficient and inadequate (see the comments of
prof. De Minico, member of the Committee, in meeting n. 3, Oct. 8th, 2014, at
http://www.camera.it/application/xmanager/projects/leg17/attachments/attivita_commissione_inte
rnet/files/000/000/003/resoconto_commissione_8ottobre.pdf (pp. 27-30). While this was being
revised for print, the final draft of the Declaration of Interent Rights has been approved on July
28, 2015: http://www.camera.it/application/xmanager/projects/leg17/commissione_internet/testo_
definitivo_inglese.pdf. This latest version takes into account the suggestions and proposals, mine
included, arising from the debate within the Committee. The results of a wide public consultation
have also been considered. Conclusively, the document can be deemed to be a well-balanced
compromise among different positions, as a constitutional inspiration should always bear.
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serves to be pursued and is becoming more than a purely speculative
exercise.
For the reasons discussed before, such a Bill should tackle two issues. Firstly, it should state that the conflict between opposite values
must be resolved according to the prevalence of individual rights over
economic liberties. Secondly, it should resolve the relationship between
the binding sources and self-regulation with the prevalence of the former over the latter. Reference could be made here to the European Convention of Human Rights and European Charter of Fundamental Rights
to point out at least three other more specific guarantees aimed at constraining the rulemaking power of policymakers: necessity, indispensability, and proportionality, extensively recalled by the two European
Courts (Eur. Ct. H.R. and ECJ).112 The language used by both is not always coincident, but it does not seem necessary to delve into the matter
here.113 I simply want to underline the fact that the discretionary power
of the legislator is anything but undefined both in the European and in
the International case law.114
The first limit, i.e. necessity, is a one-way approach, requiring the
sacrifice of a right to be accepted only if it cannot be avoided. Conversely, the sacrifice cannot be accepted if an alternative in which that

112. PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW. TEXTS, CASES AND MATERIALS, 396-400
(5th ed. 2008), in which the authors state that “Article 52(1) of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, which draws on the jurisprudence of both the ECHR and the ECJ, contains a general derogation clause, indicating the nature of restrictions on Charter rights will be acceptable.”
For a criticism to this thesis see: D. Triantafyllou, The European Charter of Fundamental Rights
and the “Rule of law”. Restricting fundamental rights by reference, at (2002) 39 CMLR 53
113. On the complex relationship between the ECHR and the ECJ see, from a large literature:
G. Harpaz, The European Court of Justice and its relationship with the European Court of Human Rights: the question of enhanced reliance, coherence and legitimacy (2009) 46 MLR 105; F.
Callewaert, The European Court Human Rights and European Union law: a long way to harmony (2009) 6 EHRLR 768-783.
114. Concerning the Eur. Ct. H.R., it has long accorded to the State Parties a margin of appraisal in making public decisions, which potentially influence ECHR (see, eg. Handyside v.
United
Kingdom
(1976)
1
EHRR
737
at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57499#{“itemid”:[“001-57499”]}).
The extent of the margin allowed by the court varies according to the policy area in question; for
example, it is usually wider in economic or national security issues, and narrow in the area of
criminal justice. As to the ECJ, it has also allowed Member States some discretion on their decision-making, stating that EU law does not impose upon the Member States an uniform scale of
values as regards the assessment of conduct which may be considered contrary to public policy
(Adoui and Cournuaille v Belgium, (Cases 115 e 116/81) [1982] ECR 1665 (par. 8)) at http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:61981CJ0115&from=EN. For an extensive overview on recent cases see: E. BERRY, M. J. HOMEWOOD & B. BOGUSZ, EU LAW 306 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
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same right remains unfettered is viable.115
The second limit, indispensability, is an instance of common
ground between the Italian Constitutional Court116 and the European
Court of Human Rights.117 The former has defined this limit as the
“minimum essential content” for rights, up to the point of inducing part
of the doctrine to consider the necessity a “limit to the limit.” 118 Conclusively, no such restriction is allowed as to substantially extinguish the
right, no matter how essential the interest pursued by the legislator may
be.
The third limit, proportionality,119 is the real test for the reasonableness of any legal provision. Costs and benefits must be assessed in
order to check that a proper balance has been found between the interests embodied in the protected rights and those on which the legislative
restriction is founded.120 The goal is to prevent limitations to rights,
which do not grant any significant and corresponding advantage to the
competing interests.121
115. See RICHARD CLAYTON & HUGH TOMLINSON, THE LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 339-40
(2nd ed. 2009).
116. Corte
Cost.,
Cass.,
22
febbraio
1990,
67
(It.)
available
at
http://www.giurcost.org/decisioni/1990/0067s-90.html.
117. The determination of the objective pursued by the restriction to a fundamental right may
be decisive to answer the question whether the limitation may be considered ‘necessary in a democratic society’, i.e. such a necessity must go beyond the mere need to achieve that aim. (See the
leading case: ECHR, (plen.) Open door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, 1992, Series A no.
246-A,
par.
64,
at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00157789#{“itemid”:[“001-57789”]})
118. Massimo Luciani, l diritti fondamentali come limiti alla revisione dela costituzione, in
LIBERTÀ E GIURISPRUDENZA CONSTITUZIONALE 121-129 (Vittorio Angiolini ed., 1992). This
expression is also common among Spanish scholars, ex multis, see Antonio-Luis MartínezPujalte, La garantía del contenido esencial de los derechos fundamentales, in CUADERNOS Y
DEBATES 65, 6 (1997).
119. JONAS CHRISTOFFERSEN, FAIR BALANCE: PROPORTIONALITY, SUBSIDIARITY AND
PRIMARITY IN THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2009); Alastair Mowbray, A
Study of the Principle of Fair Balance in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights, 2 HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV., 2, 289 (2010).
120. Mowbray supra note 119.
121. Court of Justice, Case C-360/10, Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers (SABAM) v Netlog NV (16 Febrary 2012), para. 51, at
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=119512&pageInd
ex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2210378 .
For a specific reference to data retention and electronic communications see recently:
Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) (8 April 2014), in Joined Cases C‑293/12 and C‑594/12, at
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=150642&doclang=EN.
In particular, in the paragraphs n. 46, 69 e 70 the Court recalls its previous decisions and finds in
the violation of proportionality a conclusive reason for the invalidity of Data Retention Directive
(2002/58).
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A regulation which does not comply with the aforesaid principles
may be found in the Hadopi 2. The law fails on at least three different
grounds. Firstly, it balances heterogeneous values: a fundamental right
(to access) vs. an economic interest (copyright). Secondly, it charges the
former (the fundamental right) with excessive and disproportionate
bounds. Finally, the restrictions laid down do not prove to be necessary.
A support for this conclusion may be inferred from a report showing
that the law has been unsuccessful in educating consumers to a lawful
use of the Internet.
On the contrary the English High Court does not seem to share
such a viewpoint: in fact, it has not hesitated to block alleged terrorist
access to the Internet in order to avoid the danger of dissemination of
certain ideas.122 In this judicial balancing between fundamental values, a
right is denied tout court on the occurrence not of immediate and current damage, but rather of the risk of its future occurrence.123 Therefore,
the High Court is disregarding two impassable limits safeguarding fundamental rights, putting the legitimacy of its ruling under European legal standards at serious risk.
Finally, I find a substantial support to my claims in the action of
the ECtHR,124 as quoted above. Limitations on fundamental rights and
liberties may be allowed only if indispensable, not differently avoidable,
and a correct and proportionate balance is found between the competing
interests. This clear conclusion should contribute to the core of an Internet Bill such as it is proposed in this paper. More detailed rules could be
left to self-regulation, in coherence with the opinion – set forth in this
paper - that maintaining the legally binding rules to a minimum is the
best choice for the Internet.
VI. EQUALITY ON THE INTERNET: MYTH OR REALITY?
I have underlined the need for a “Bill of Rights” tailored to the Internet, entrusted to a supranational legislator. I wish to point out now
that two preliminary requirements should be met.
Firstly, the legislator should resort in its own rulemaking to
self-defining concepts rather than to general clauses, and to substantive regulation instead of uncertain and general principles inevitably
in need of broad interpretations. Secondly, the legislator should re122. AM vs. Secretary of State for the Home Dept. [2001] EWHC 2486 A.C. available at
www.bailii.org..
123. Id.
124. Infra at 115, 117 and 119.
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turn each actor, be it public or private, to its own domain, returning
political choice to the policy-makers, wresting it back both from Independent Authorities and private powers, to which it has been entrusted through a broad delegation by policy-makers. This approach
would allow Authorities to be entrusted with tasks more appropriate
to their institutional position, involving no political responsibility. At
the same time, the judicial power would be called to apply rules sufficiently defined in their content, enforcing the political project
sketched out by the legislator, rather than starting one ex novo.
A final question arises: is there a set of values, which the legislator will have to accept and enforce in drawing up a discipline well
suited to the Internet? In my opinion, such a set of values does exist
even now: it is made up of the principles of modern constitutionalism
commonly shared in the European and Anglo-American experience,
although it is clear that these principles must be rethought on the basis of the peculiarities of the Internet. 125
The first and paramount value to be taken into account is equality, which should thus be the keystone of a regulatory framework for
the Internet. The virtual world is - no less than the real one - marked
by strong inequalities, to be compensated with asymmetric regulation
in bonam partem.126 This concept leads to rules intended to promote
weaker social categories in need of an additional protection in order
that a greater equality may be effectively pursued.
This is the foremost challenge of the Internet.
The infinite possibilities of a better quality of life, better services, greater knowledge generated by the network must represent a
chance for social redemption for those who so far have not been allowed to share economic prosperity and social inclusion. This is even
more important because - in a world marked by increasing inequalities, which are a serious threat to the future of us all - the network
proposes itself as the only tool potentially able to reverse the trend,
even offering a new model of peaceful coexistence. In this sense, Internet can become the cornerstone of modern democracies, no less
than the freedom of speech and of the press has already been in the

125. In the same direction indicated above see J. Rowbottom, In the shadow of the Big Media: Freedom of expression, Participation and the Production of Knowledge Online, 3 PUBLIC
LAW, 509 (2014).
126. Giovanna De Minico, The 2002 EC Directives Telecommunications: Regime up to the
2008 Ongoing Revision – Have the Goals been Reached? 19 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 657, 658-59
(2008).
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past.
The goal of equality means that the Internet must be redeemed
from the narrow image of a ‘land’ populated only by selfish myths of
liberalism. Internet must be defended as the largest public space that
humanity has ever had to gain experience of civic virtues and policies.
The issue of equality can be summarized in the right for citizens
to access the Internet, for operators to next generation networks and,
ultimately, for consumers to services. 127 The right of citizens’ access
consists in the universal provision of fast connection, regardless of
location or income of the net-citizens. The right of operators aims to
assure that network architecture is easily accessible to the non-owner
operators. The right of the consumers to services meets the need to
provide consumers with a broad choice between plural products offered by different economically independent entrepreneurs, in opposition to the substantial oligopoly of the giants of the network.
The goal of equality can only be pursued fighting powerful enemies. Its achievement is not a natural and predictable outcome of
technical progress, which is not inherently oriented in a unique and
predetermined direction. I am disputing the argument that the so
called Lex Informatica128 could be a primary and automatic source of
a rule-making oriented per se and by default to the common good.
Such a result may be obtained only if the policymaker has pursued
equality as a specific goal, and has consequently provided effective
means to achieve it. The preliminary choice of the goal that the technique should achieve belongs to the author of the rule, together with
the accountability for the choice itself.
The best choice is found focusing on the recipient of the benefit
provided by the technique. Should it be the weaker subject, or the already stronger one? In the first case, the technique will be the driving
force for socially well-distributed growth; in the second case, the
same will be the multiplier of well-being in favour of those who are
already advantaged per se.
I can find immediate examples in the access to the broadband,
not yet promoted as a universal service; in the architecture of the
127. Another work develops a wider and more comprehensive analysis of equality and the
Internet: G. De Minico, INTERNET. REGOLA E ANARCHIA [INTERNET. RULES AND ANARCHY],
chapters II and III.
128. Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules
through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 555 (1998).
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Next generation networks designed in favour of the ex-incumbent; or
in the absence of regulation to guarantee net neutrality. 129 The examination of national legislation and implementation measures is disappointing, since it shows that the conflict between the under-protected
categories – such as new operators, netizens, children - and the economic interests of communication enterprises has been basically resolved in favour of the latter. 130 The law of the market seems to have
won in the end. Because of that, the weaker parties do not receive the
additional protection that they would deserve in accordance with the
network promoted as the new lever of modern constitutionalism. To
this end, what should the supranational legislator do?
As a priority, asymmetrical rules should be adopted with the
purpose of reversing the current trend in favour of adult users, operators in dominant position, citizens already provided with a connection. The regulatory focus should be re-oriented in favour of children, neo-entrants entrepreneurs and citizens who cannot afford a
connection at market prices.
The unbalanced relationship now in existence between the weak
categories and communication enterprises is to be overturned. This
would also be in accordance with the social mission to such enterprises should in principle already obey. 131 The point is that the com129. The theme of net neutrality would deserve an autonomous work. Within the scope of this
essay I refer to note 38 for its definition and to notes 39 and 40 for recent developments due to the
procedures pending before F.C.C.. For a closer examination see especially: S. Zack,
REGULATING THE WEB: NETWORK NEUTRALITY AND THE FATE OF THE OPEN INTERNET, (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2013); A.C. Firth . – N. H. Pierson. (eds), THE OPEN INTERNET, NET
NEUTRALITY AND THE FCC (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2011); T. W. Hazlett., THE
FALLACY OF NET NEUTRALITY, (New York: Encounter Books, 2011); C. T. Marsden, NET
NEUTRALITY: TOWARDS A CO-REGULATORY SOLUTION, (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2010);
D. C. Nunziato Virtual freedom: net neutrality and free speech in the Internet age, (Stanford: California Stanford Law Books, 2009); J. Zittrain, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO
STOP IT, (New Haven - London: Yale University Press, 2009).
130. Should it still be necessary, a further example may be found in the issue between the
protection of the children and the promotion of the enterprises operating in Internet. In this querelle the former value has been sacrificed in favour of economic interests. In fact, the protections
against offence speeches and hard images offered by filters have not been enough, the autodeclaration of the age requested by Facebook and Twitter is ridiculous, the selective surf is not
practicable. These defeatsare not due to a deficiency of technique, but to the weakness of political
projects in favour of children as compared with the strong economic interests involved. I have
dealt with this issue in a previous essay: ‘Il favor constitutionis e il minore: realtà o fantasia?’
(The Favor Constitutionis and the child: reality or mere fantasy? at G. De Minico (ed), Nuovi media e minori, [New Media and children] (Roma: Aracne, 2012) 35-42.
131. I refer to a “social mission” because this particular organization of persons and means
operates in the market of ideas. So it has a direct effect on the process of shaping individual consciences and public opinion in general. Such a scope justifies the particular regime, which this
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munication enterprises have been detached from the common good
following an incorrect concept of the market economy that reduces
public intervention to ultra-minimal standards. We are currently facing a poor imitation of the Smithian chimera of an automatic harmony between public and individual interests: a myth to which not even
Smith – in my opinion - seemed to believe fully. 132
New concepts are required if the Internet is to be regulated in coherence with the values of equality and individual rights. These values
are the only ones able to ensure that technological progress ends up in a
chance of growth for all, aligning the weak categories with the wellfunded ones, something that up to now has been real only in the world
of dreams.

kind of enterprise should be submitted to.
132. G. Kennedy, Adam Smith and the Invisible Hand: From Metaphor to Myth 6 ECON.
JOURNAL WATCH, 2, 250 (2009). The author clearly explains that Smith had never said that public and private interests could combine each other by the default “wholly misleading belief of how
commercial markets function”, because instead the intervention of the State would be necessary
to this end. For a different perspective see: D. B. Klein, In Adam Smith’s Invisible Hands: Comment on Gavin Kennedy 6 ECON JOURNAL WATCH, 2,264-279 (2009).

